1/12/05 - 11:30am

According to a report in today's Washington Post, the search for Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction came to a quiet end shortly before the holiday season. This critical point in our recent Iraq policy came with considerable less fanfare than other important events. Curious considering the public relations spectacle created by the administration with the carrier landing following what Bush termed the 'ending of major combat operations in Iraq'. Consider the following statements from Bush's 2003 State of the Union Speech in January of that year when Bush made his case for the Iraq War:

- 'Before September the 11th, many in the world believed that Saddam Hussein could be contained. But chemical agents, lethal viruses and shadowy terrorist networks are not easily contained. Imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons and other plans -- this time armed by Saddam Hussein.'

- 'Twelve years ago, Saddam Hussein faced the prospect of being the last casualty in a war he had started and lost. To spare himself, he agreed to disarm of all weapons of mass destruction. For the next 12 years, he systematically violated that agreement.'

- 'U.S. intelligence indicates that Saddam Hussein had upwards of 30,000 munitions capable of delivering chemical agents.'

- 'The International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed in the 1990s that Saddam Hussein had an advanced nuclear weapons development program, had a design for a nuclear weapon and was working on five different methods of enriching uranium for a bomb ... Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa. Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production ... He clearly has much to hide.'

- 'The dictator of Iraq is not disarming. To the contrary; he is deceiving. From intelligence sources we know, for instance, that thousands of Iraqi security personnel are at work hiding documents and materials from the U.N. inspectors, sanitizing inspection sites and monitoring the inspectors themselves.'

While today, the above quotes will be seen by many a source of some ironic amusement, the following quotes, delivered only a few weeks later, March 7th, 2003, by the heads of the UN Weapons inspection teams that had been on the ground in Iraq for several months, are anything but funny, particularly when it is considered that they came three weeks before President Bush went to war, supposedly to deliver us from an Iraqi WMD threat:

From El-Baradei regarding Nuclear Weapons Programs:

- 'At the outset, let me state on general observation, namely that during the past four years at the majority of Iraqi sites industrial capacity has deteriorated substantially due to the departure of the foreign support that was often present in the late '80s, the departure of large numbers of skilled Iraqi personnel in the past decade and the lack of consistent maintenance by Iraq of sophisticated equipment.'

- 'This overall deterioration in industrial capacity is naturally of direct relevance to Iraq's capability for resuming a nuclear weapons program.'

- 'The IAEA has now conducted a total of 218 nuclear inspections at 141 sites, including 21 that have not been inspected before. In addition, the agency experts have taken part in many joint UNMOVIC [U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission]-IAEA inspections.'

- '... in the last few weeks, Iraq has provided a considerable volume of documentation relevant to the issues I reported earlier as being of particular concern, including Iraq's efforts to procure aluminum tubes, its attempted procurement of magnets and magnets-production capabilities and its reported attempt to import uranium. '

- 'Based on available evidence, the IAEA team has concluded that Iraq efforts to import these aluminum tubes were not likely to have been related to the manufacture of centrifuge, and moreover that it was highly unlikely that Iraq could have achieved the considerable redesign needed to use them in a revived centrifuge program.'

- 'Through visits to research and production sites, review of engineering drawings and analysis of sample magnets, the IAEA experts familiar with the use of such magnets in centrifuge enrichment have verified that none of the magnets that Iraq has declared could be used directly for centrifuge magnetic bearings. '

- 'Based on thorough analysis, the IAEA has concluded with the concurrence of outside experts that these documents which formed the basis for the report of recent uranium transaction between Iraq and Niger are in fact not authentic. We have therefore concluded that these specific allegations are unfounded. However, we will continue to follow up any additional evidence if it emerges relevant to efforts by Iraq to illicitly import nuclear materials.'

- 'Mr. President, in conclusion, I am able to report today that in the area of nuclear weapons, the most lethal weapons of mass destruction, inspections in Iraq are moving forward ... Since the resumption of inspection a little over three months ago, and particularly during the three weeks since my last ordered report to the council, the IAEA has made important progress in identifying what nuclear-related capabilities remain in Iraq and in its assessment of whether Iraq has made any effort to revive its past nuclear program during the intervening four years since inspections were brought to a halt.'

- 'At this stage, the following can be stated: One, there is no indication of resumed nuclear activities in those buildings that were identified through the use of satellite imagery as being reconstructed or newly erected since 1998, nor any indication of nuclear-related prohibited activities at any inspected sites. Second, there is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import uranium since 1990. Three, there is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import aluminum tubes for use in centrifuge enrichment. Moreover, even had Iraq pursued such a plan, it would have encountered practical difficulties in manufacturing centrifuge out of the aluminum tubes in question. Fourth, although we are still reviewing issues related to magnets and magnet-production, there is no indication to date that Iraq imported magnets for use in centrifuge enrichment program.'

- 'After three months of intrusive inspections, we have to date found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapon program in Iraq.'

From Hans Blix regarding Iraq's Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs:

- 'Inspections in Iraq resumed on the 27th of November 2002. In matters relating to process, notably prompt access to sites, we have faced relatively few difficulties, and certainly much less than those that were faced by UNSCOM [U.N. Special Commission] in the period 1991 to 1998. This may well be due to the strong outside pressure ... This is not to say that the operation of inspections is free from frictions, but at this juncture we are able to perform professional, no-notice inspections all over Iraq and to increase aerial surveillance. '

- 'As I noted on the 14th of February, [US & British] intelligence authorities have claimed that weapons of mass destruction are moved around Iraq by trucks, in particular that there are mobile production units for biological weapons. The Iraqi side states that such activities do not exist ... Several inspections have taken place at declared and undeclared sites in relation to mobile production facilities. Food-testing mobile laboratories and mobile workshops have been seen as well as large containers with seed-processing equipment. No evidence of proscribed activities have so far been found.'

- 'During inspections of declared or undeclared facilities, inspection teams have examined building structures for any possible underground facilities. In addition, ground-penetrating radar equipment was used in several specific locations. No underground facilities for chemical or biological production or storage were found so far.'

- 'On 14 February, I reported to the council that the Iraqi side had become more active in taking and proposing steps which potentially might shed new light on unresolved disarmament issues. Even a week ago, when the current quarterly report was finalized, there were still relatively little tangible progress to note. Hence, the cautious formulations in the report before you. As of today, there is more.'

- 'While during our meetings in Baghdad, the Iraqi side tried to persuade us that the Al Samoud 2 missiles they have declared fall within the permissible range set by the Security Council. The calculations of an international panel of experts led us to the opposite conclusion. Iraq has since accepted that these missiles and associated items be destroyed and has started the process of destruction under our supervision.'

- 'More papers on anthrax, VX and missiles have recently been provided. Many have been found to restate what Iraq already has declared, and some will require further study and discussion ... There is a significant Iraqi effort under way to clarify a major source of uncertainty as to the quantities of biological and chemical weapons which were unilaterally destroyed in 1991. A part of this effort concerns a disposal site, which was deemed too dangerous for full investigation in the past. It is now being re-excavated.'

- 'Iraq proposed an investigation using advanced technology to quantify the amount of unilaterally destroyed anthrax dumped at a site. However, even if the use of advanced technology could quantify the amount of anthrax said to be dumped at the site, the results will still be open to interpretation. Defining the quantity of anthrax destroyed must of course be followed by efforts to establish what quantity was actually produced.'

- 'Mr. President, what are we to make of these activities? One can hardly avoid the impression that after a period of somewhat reluctant cooperation, there's been an acceleration of initiatives from the Iraqi side since the end of January. This is welcome.'

- 'Against this background, the question is now asked whether Iraq has cooperated, 'immediately, unconditionally and actively,' with UNMOVIC, as is required under Paragraph 9 of Resolution 1441. The answers can be seen from the factor descriptions that I have provided. However, if more direct answers are desired, I would say the following: The Iraqi side has tried on occasion to attach conditions, as it did regarding helicopters and U-2 planes. It has not, however, so far persisted in this or other conditions for the exercise of any of our inspection rights. If it did, we would report it. It is obvious that while the numerous initiatives which are now taken by the Iraqi side with a view to resolving some longstanding, open disarmament issues can be seen as active or even proactive, these initiatives three to four months into the new resolution cannot be said to constitute immediate cooperation. Nor do they necessarily cover all areas of relevance. They are, nevertheless, welcome. And UNMOVIC is responding to them in the hope of solving presently unresolved disarmament issues. '

- 'How much time would it take to resolve the key remaining disarmament tasks? While cooperation can -- cooperation can and is to be immediate, disarmament, and at any rate verification of it, cannot be instant. Even with a proactive Iraqi attitude induced by continued outside pressure, it will still take some time to verify sites and items, analyze documents, interview relevant persons and draw conclusions. It will not take years, nor weeks, but months. Neither governments nor inspectors would want disarmament inspection to go on forever. However, it must be remembered that in accordance with the governing resolutions, a sustained inspection and monitoring system is to remain in place after verified disarmament to give confidence and to strike an alarm if signs were seen of the revival of any proscribed weapons programs.'

Most Americans are not aware of the content of the Weapons inspector’s reports. They may not be aware of the reports at all. I was following the events regarding Iraq very closely at the time and I remember reading them almost immediately after they were given. I remember thinking to myself and then saying to my wife Alexis, 'Oh, well, since Iraq is doing a good job cooperating with the inspectors and no weapons of mass destruction have been found, I guess Bush is going to call the war off since the reasons he gave a couple of weeks ago do not seem to be valid. I mean, if he doesn't how could he possibly justify war now?' How short lived those thoughts were.

When I recall the events that led to war; the speeches, the reports and I factor in what has happened since, all the Americans and Iraqis that have died, or have been maimed for life, the fact that no weapons of mass destruction have been found (just as one would expect from reading the UN Weapons Inspector reports) it really makes me upset. I recall Rhett Butler's words to Scarlett O'Hara during the Gone With the Wind scene where Atlanta was falling to Sherman: 'I'm angry. Waste always makes me angry! And that's what all this is. Sheer waste.' I am glad of one thing. I am very glad I am not a member of this administration that has to get up each day and look in the mirror and think about the young, brave, patriotic and honorable young men and women of our armed forces who made the supreme sacrifice for this war or who have to live maimed for the rest of their lives as a result of this war. I'm glad I don’t have to feel guilty about the spouses widowed, the parents grieving for their children and the children left without a parent. Then again, take all of that back. I do feel guilty, terribly guilty. I'm an American. All of this was done in my name and the name of my country. Those people who died or were maimed took an oath to obey their superiors because they wanted to protect me. My job was to keep faith with them and make sure our leaders didn’t sacrifice them needlessly. I failed.